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Asymmetric Information, Option to Wait to Invest
and the Optimal Level of Investment
Robert Lensink and Elmer Sterken
December 6, 1999
Abstract
This paper analyzes equilibrium rationing on credit markets in the
case of gains from waiting to acquire information about the future
protability of investment. We compare the competitive outcome with
the socially optimal level of investment. We show that the opportu-
nity to postpone investment changes the nature of the ineciencies of
the competitive outcome fundamentally. Without the option to wait,
high risk rms tend to invest and the outcome is characterized by a
situation of underinvestment. If rms can wait high risk rms benet
the most from waiting. In this case low risk rms tend to invest im-
mediately and a situation of overinvestment will result, since from the
banks’ point of view rms do not delay enough.
JEL code: D81; D92; E22
Keywords: Irreversible Investment; Asymmetric Information
1 Introduction
Asymmetric information may lead to equilibrium rationing of external funds
available for real investment (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). More recent
literature shows that due to costly reversibility there might be an opportu-
nity cost of investing immediately rather than waiting (see e.g. Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994). The novelty of this paper is that it combines both the im-
plications of asymmetric information in the credit market and the option to
∗Correspondence to: Robert Lensink, University Of Groningen, Faculty of Economics,
The Netherlands. PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands. Phone: +31-50-
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wait. We examine whether the optimal level of real investment from a social
point of view corresponds with the competitive outcome for two models with
asymmetric information: in the rst model we assume that there is no option
to wait, while in the second one there is. The possibility to delay investment
changes the nature of the ineciencies of the competitive outcome funda-
mentally. The competitive outcome is characterized by underinvestment if
there is no possibility to delay. However, in case the investment decision can
be postponed, there are too many high risk rms investing immediately. We
analyze how taxing can prevent this form of dynamic misallocation.
The next section presents the basic model, in which no option value of
waiting is taken into account. Section 3 extends the base model by taking
into account that investing rms have an option value to wait. We consider
the extreme case where investment is completely irreversible and waiting
resolves uncertainty. Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model without an option to wait
We present the base model in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The
model resembles the models of Gale (1990 and 1991), De Meza and Webb
(1987 and 1988) and especially Mankiw (1986). Mankiw examines the allo-
cation of credit in a market in which borrowers have more information about
their own riskiness than lenders. He illustrates, by analyzing a one-period
model for the market for scholarships, that the allocation of credit may be
inecient and may be improved by government intervention. We consider a
two-period setting and apply the model to the market for bank loans. The
model consists of dierent types of rms, a representative commercial bank
and a government.
2.1 The decision rules for rms and the bank
The model includes a continuum of risk neutral rms. Each rm decides
whether it will invest (I) in a project or deposit its initial wealth (W ) on a
savings account on which a safe rate of interest  is paid by a bank. There is
one project available per rm, so that rms and projects are interchangeable.
There is only one decision moment, namely at t = 0. If a rm invests, its
initial wealth is assumed to be too low for its given investment plan so that
the rm has to raise outside nance by an amount L = I−W . We assume in
line with De Meza and Webb (1988, p. 17) and Gale (1990, p. 180) that the
costs of issuing equity and bonds are prohibitively high, so the rm needs
bank loans L. The state of the world in the rst period is known, but in the
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following periods there is a good and a bad state. Hence, we assume that
there is only uncertainty in the future. This assumption is in line with the
work by Pindyck (1982) and Abel (1983) who argue that rms face much
more uncertainty over future events than over the current period. If the rm
invests, the payo in the rst period equals F0. In the second and following
periods, the expected project return in the good state equals Ri and zero in
the bad state (the subscript i refers to rm of type i). The project return
will remain at this level forever. It is assumed that the size of the project
(I), initial wealth (W ) and the payo in the rst period (F0) are the same
for all rms. In line with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) it is assumed that the
expected return of projects (A) is equal. The heterogeneity of rms is taken
into account by assuming that rms dier with respect to return in case the
project is successful and with respect to the probability of success (qi). qi
is the riskiness parameter, which is privately observed. An increase in qi
means less risk in the sense of mean preserving spread. We assume that qi
is uniformly distributed between q0 and qH with 0 < q0  qi  qH < 1. The










The rm will undertake the investment project if the expected return from
the project exceeds the opportunity cost. If the lending rate for a rm equals
r, and if it is assumed that the risk over project returns is fully diversiable
(with a complete spanning of nancial markets) so that the rm discounts
cash flows with the safe rate of interest , the rm invests if:











Using equation (1) this expression can be rewritten in terms of a net present
value at time t = 0:
NPV f0;i = (F0 − rL) +
qi

(Ri − rL)− (1 + )W  0 (3)
This expression gives the rst period return, the expected return in later
periods, and the opportunity costs of investing in the safe asset, respectively.
The risk level for the marginal rm (qs), which is the rm for which the




(A− (1 + )W )−  (4)
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Equation (3) shows that, for a given lending rate r, the less risky the project
(the higher the qi) is the lower net prots are. Since dqsdr =
−(qs+)
r < 0
the reservation lending rate, i.e. the cuto lending rate above which rms
decide not to invest, is higher for the high risk rms. Hence, an increase
in the lending rate will drive out the low risk rms or, for a given lending
rate, the risky projects will be executed rst. Hence, the expected payos
for rms decrease in q. Therefore, the marginal rm is the rm within the
group of investing rms with the lowest risk level.
Asymmetric information enters the model by assuming that the bank,
unlike rms, is not able to observe the risk level of individual rms. The bank
only has knowledge about the distribution of qi. On the other hand, both the
bank and rms (and also the government) know the expected return of the
various projects. Since the bank cannot observe qi, it cannot discriminate
among rms and hence oers the same debt contract to all rms. This
implies that the lending rate will be determined by the entire group of
investing rms, and a pooling equilibrium under asymmetric information
results.
The bank’s net return to lending equals the return on the lending minus
the opportunity costs of the loan, which is given by the safe rate of return
on the savings account. Note that these safe returns equal L. The return
on lending consists of the certain interest payments in the rst period and
the interest payments times the probability of a good state in the future
periods. Hence, the net return for the bank on project i is:





− (1 + )L = rL(1 + qi

)− (1 + )L (5)
It is assumed that the representative commercial bank faces perfect compe-
tition in the banking market.1 Hence, bank returns are zero for the average





1The model assumes that a bank exists. It abstracts from the possibility that en-
dogenous intermediary coalitions emerge which evaluate loan projects ex ante, by which
incentives of rms are structured in such a way that a Pareto-optimal allocation is brought
about. For this type of model, see e.g. Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Williamson (1988).
More in general, our model does not consider possible monitoring activities of banks which
may improve the eciency of the decentralized outcomes with asymmetric information (see
e.g. Diamond, 1984 and Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984).
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Note that bank returns are positive for the marginal rm (NPV b0;s > 0)
since bank returns are increasing in qi. Equations (4), (6) and (7) determine
a pooling equilibrium.
2.2 Social optimum
From a social point of view all projects with positive social return should
be undertaken. The social return (S0;i) of a project i is equal to the sum of
NPV f0;i and bank returns NPV
b
0;i: S0;i = A− (1+)I, which is independent
of the riskiness of the project and assumed to be positive. In order to
characterize the competitive outcome it suces to consider bank returns for
the marginal rm. Since bank returns, and hence also social returns, are
positive at the margin, some low risk applicants will not participate although
they should from a social point of view. Hence, in general the competitive
outcome will be characterized by underinvestment.
3 The model with an option to wait
In the previous section investment is modeled as a decision to be taken
now or never. However, in practice investment will be at least partially
irreversible, which implies that it might be protable to wait to obtain more
information on the state of the world.
3.1 Decision rules for rms and the bank with waiting
In our model rms decide whether to invest immediately or to wait for one
more period. The rms that invest immediately need outside nance from
the bank. Firms decide to invest immediately based on the option value,
which is calculated by subtracting the net return from investing immediately
(given by equation (3)) from the net return of investing when the rm waits.
It can be shown that the net return from investing in case the rm waits
equals:
NPV fw;i = 0 +
qi

(Ri − L)− qiW (8)
In line with equation (3) the rst term refers to the rst period return (which
equals 0), the second term to the return in later periods and the third term
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w;i −NPV f0;i = −(F0 − rL) +
qiL

(r − ) + W (1− qi) + W
(9)
The return form waiting and the option value can be interpreted as follows.
First, if the rm waits there is no return on the rst period investment.
The foregone gains of waiting then equal −(F0 − rL). Second, if the rm
waits, the lending rate on loans starting in period 1 equals the risk free
rate, since the returns for the bank are guaranteed under the assumption
that waiting resolves uncertainty. This benet of waiting, with an expected
value of qiL (r − ), will be higher for rms with a higher probability of
success and increases with the amount of the loan. Third, since waiting
resolves uncertainty, a rm will only invest in the good state. This implies
that the expected value of funds used for the investment only equals qiW .
The gain from waiting then equals W (1 − qi), which will be higher the
lower the probability of success. Hence, depending on the parameters of the
model, an increase in qi has a positive or negative eect on the option value.
Therefore, it is ambiguous whether the high or low risk rms will wait to
invest, as will be shown below. Finally, if the rms waits for one period, the
opportunity costs of safe funds for the rst period (W ) are not lost.
If Vi < 0 the rm decides to invest immediately. By comparing equations
(3) and (9), and after some manipulation, it can be easily seen that the hur-
dle for investment, i.e. the minimum required return a rm expects to get
from investing immediately, is higher in case the option value is considered.
This is a standard result of investment irreversibility (see Dixit and Pindyck,
1994). The option to delay investment makes rms more reluctant to in-
vest since there is an additional cost of immediate investment: immediate
investment implies that the option to invest no longer exists.
The risk level of the marginal rm is found by setting the option value
Vi equal to zero:
qs =
((F0 − rL)− (1 + )W )
L(r − )− W (10)
Since the sign of dqsdr =
L(+qs)
I−rL is ambiguous, it is not clear whether the
high or low risk rms will wait. If rL < I, that is if the loan repayment
is smaller than the safe return on the project, dqs=dr > 0. If the size of
the repayment on the loan is relatively low, the low risk rms have a higher
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reservation rate than the high risk rms. This implies that an increase in
the lending rate will drive out the high risk investors so that, in contrast to
the analysis in the previous section, the low risk projects will be executed
immediately while the high risk rms will wait. Waiting resolves uncertainty,
so that entrepreneurs only invest if the project is protable, which implies
that high risk rms, who have a high probability of having a bad return,
will benet the most from waiting. If the amount of borrowing is high
(rL > I), dqsdr < 0, so an increase in the lending rate will drive out the low
risk investors, similar to the analysis in the previous section. The low risk
rms will wait. Because of adverse selection, low risk rms obtain poor loan
terms if they invest immediately.
After uncertainty is resolved the bank can only charge the risk free rate,
so that bank returns after waiting are 0. Therefore, the change in returns
for banks due to waiting by rms equals:




The bank is indierent between waiting or immediately investing if NPV bi =





For low risk rms (qi > qind) the bank prefers immediate investing, for high
risk rms (qi < qind) the bank prefers that the rm waits. For the average
immediately investing rm bank returns are zero and hence the bank is
indierent between waiting or investing immediately.
If high risk rms wait, so that the marginal rm investing immediately is






The equations (6), (10) and (13) then simultaneously determine a pooling
equilibrium for the early investors. The marginal rm takes more risk than
the rm with the average risk level, so that bank returns are negative for the
marginal rm (NPV b0;s < 0). This implies that the bank would have gained
had the marginal rm waited for one period (NPV bs > 0). Otherwise,
when low risk rms wait and hence the marginal rm of the group of rms
investing immediately is the rm with the lowest risk level, the pooling
equilibrium for early investors is determined by equations (6), (10) and (7).
In this case, bank returns are positive for the marginal rm.
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3.2 Government and social optimum
The social value of waiting (V S) equals the sum of the value of waiting for
rms (equation (9)) plus the change in bank prot due to waiting by rms
(equation (11)). This gives:
V Si = −F0 + I(1 + − qi) (14)
From a social point of view all projects with a V Si < 0 should be undertaken
immediately. The marginal social project is determined by:
qA = −F0
I
+ (1 + ) (15)
Since @V S@qi = −I < 0, the relatively safe rms (for which qi  qA) should in-
vest immediately. If high risk rms wait (for the case with the smaller loans)
and hence @Vi@qi < 0; all projects with qi > qs will be undertaken immediately.
Since waiting resolves uncertainty, the only distortion stems from adverse
selection in the rst period. Therefore, the competitive outcome again can
be characterized by considering bank prots in the rst period. Since in
this case bank prots are negative for the marginal rm (NPV b0;s < 0 and
hence NPV bs > 0) the value of waiting to society for the marginal rm is
positive (V Ss > 0). This implies that too many risky rms are investing
immediately. Hence, in contrast to the analysis presented in the previous
section, the competitive outcome is characterized by overinvestment.2 Al-
ternatively, if the loan size is such that rL > I and @Vi@qi > 0 and hence the
relatively safe rms wait, all projects for which qi < qs will be undertaken
immediately. Since bank prots are now positive for the marginal rm, the
value of waiting to society is negative at the margin. This implies that from
a social point of view too few safe rms are investing immediately, which is
comparable to the analysis in the previous section. However, it should be
noted that since @V S@qi < 0 and
@Vi
@qi
> 0, the value to society from waiting
is positive for the undertaken projects with the highest risk level (qi = q0).
Hence, the competitive outcome is also characterized by too many risky
rms investing immediately, which again is in contrast with the analysis for
which the option to wait is not taken into account.
2Note that De Meza and Webb (1987), by using a model similar to that of Stiglitz and
Weiss, also show that the equilibrium may be characterized by over-investment. How-
ever, their result stems from the assumption with respect to the heterogeneity of projects,
whereas our result stems from the introduction of irreversible investment and the possi-
bility to delay. We, in line with the original Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model, assume that
the expected returns of dierent projects are the same, while the probability of success
and the return in the good state dier. De Meza and Webb, on the other hand, assume
that expected returns of projects dier.
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3.3 Taxation
Since our analysis shows that the market equilibrium possibly does not lead
to an optimal outcome from a social point of view, it is natural to consider
whether taxation can have eciency-enhancing eects. Normally models
almost always assume ecient allocation of resources if there are no tax
distortions. For instance, if we assume symmetric information about q,
taxation would have no rst-order eects on eciency. In this case capital
taxation will lead to underinvestment. Here we concentrate on the case with
overinvestment due to waiting (rL < I).
Taxing does not aect the social optimum, since tax payments are re-
ceived by the government. But taxing might lead to a shift in the marginal
rm that invests. So in case of overinvestment due to the option value of
waiting an increase in qs leads to a welfare improvement. To that extent it
is important to know what types of tax policy can lead to a dqs=d > 0,
where  is a tax rate to be dened later. A natural candidate is a capital
return tax on the uncertain returns Ri. However, since this does not aect
the option value of waiting nor the income of the bank it is not eective.
We therefore consider two other forms of tax policy. We can tax the certain
rst period return F0 of the rm. Secondly we can tax the interest income
of the bank.





(qs + qH + 2)F0
(1− )F0 + (2qs + qH + 2)I − (1 + )(W + 2) (16)
The sign of this expression is ambiguous. So taxing the rst period return
does not lead with certainty to a reduction of the overinvestment problem.
It might be so that an increase of the tax rate leads to an increase of the
lendig rate, which lowers qs.
Secondly, we can tax the interest income of banks (1− )rL. This leads
to an adjustment of the lending rate:
r =
(1 + )
(1− )(P + ) (17)




(qs + qH + 2)(qsI + F0 − (1 + )W )
(1− )[qsI + F0 − (1 + )W + (2 + qs + qH)I] + 2(1 + )L (18)
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Next we show that dqs=d > 0. The numerator of (18) is positive since
qsI + F0 − (1 + )W = (1 + 1)rL > 0. Using the same identity and
(1− )(2 + qs + qH)I = 2(1 + )
r
I (19)
we can rewrite the denominator as:





I − 2(1 + )L




L + 2(I − rL) (20)
which is clearly positive for rL < I. This implies that taxing interest repay-
ments will increase the market interest rate r, which leads unambiguously
to a higher qs.
4 Summary and conclusions
This paper compares the competitive level of investment with the optimal
level of investment from a social point of view. The innovation of the paper
is that it considers an option value to wait. We start by deriving the optimal
level of investment in a standard model with asymmetric information, where
the option value to wait is not taken into account. For this case the com-
petitive outcome is characterized by underinvestment. Next, we introduce
an option to wait for rms. We show that this changes the nature of the
ineciencies of the competitive outcome fundamentally. Most importantly,
the optimal outcome from a social point of view depends on the risk level
of rms when an option value is taken into account, whereas the socially
optimal outcome is not aected by the risk level when rms can not wait to
invest. This implies that there are also some high risk rms that invest im-
mediately, although for the social optimum they should not. The option to
wait may lead to a situation of overinvestment. This will be the case when
the loan repayment is smaller than the safe return on the project. Finally,
we show that taxing returns on investment is not a viable instrument to im-
prove the market equilibrium. In order to improve the market equilibrium
from a social point of view, the government may consider to tax interest
income of banks when there is overinvestment.
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